AI
A quick GROK
This document is the first annual report (dated December 2025) by Jonathan Hall K.C., the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, appointed in February 2024. It reviews the operation of Parts 1 and 2 of the National Security Act 2023 (NSA), which came into force on 20 December 2023, along with related border powers under Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. The review assesses whether the new laws effectively counter state threats (malign activities by foreign powers below the threshold of armed conflict) while avoiding excessive overreach, protecting rights, and ensuring proportionality.
Overview of the National Security Act 2023
The NSA modernises outdated espionage laws (repealing parts of the Official Secrets Acts) and introduces new offences to address evolving threats from states like Russia, China, and Iran. Key features include:
- Broad, typology-based offences covering espionage (e.g., disclosing protected information or trade secrets), assisting foreign intelligence services (Sections 1–3, 17), sabotage (Section 12), foreign interference (Section 13, including in elections), prohibited places access (Sections 4–11), and preparatory conduct (Section 18).
- A “foreign power condition” linking acts to foreign states (including allies, proxies, or unwitting actors), with wide extraterritorial application.
- Enhanced police powers: arrest/detention up to 14 days, border examinations (suspicion-less under Schedule 3), and civil prevention measures (State Threats Prevention and Investigation Measures, STPIMs).
- Aims to make the UK a “harder target” for hostile actors, inspired by incidents like the 2018 Salisbury attack.
The Act treats economic security as intertwined with national security and uses “tech-proof” language to cover cyber and remote acts.
Usage and Statistics in 2024
As the Act was new, comprehensive official statistics (unlike those for terrorism laws) were not yet published in 2024. The report notes limited data availability to avoid revealing capabilities to adversaries. No aggregate figures for arrests, charges, prosecutions, or convictions under the main offences are provided. Notable mentions:
- One conviction under Schedule 3 for failing to comply with a border examination (R v Adam Karim, March 2024).
- No STPIMs imposed.
- Preliminary use of powers, with emerging prosecutions (not detailed to avoid prejudicing cases).
(The report predates some high-profile 2024/2025 cases under the Act, such as charges against individuals accused of assisting Russian, Chinese, or Iranian intelligence services.)
Notable Examples and Hypotheticals
The report uses anonymised or historical examples to illustrate risks, including:
- Unwitting assistance to foreign intelligence (e.g., sharing public code or providing services).
- Border examinations yielding evidence for exclusions (e.g., links to China’s United Front Work Department).
- Scenarios involving journalists, academics, or diaspora members potentially caught by broad definitions.
Challenges and Risks
The reviewer highlights potential overreach:
- Broad definitions (e.g., “ought reasonably to know”) risk criminalising naïve or innocent conduct, chilling free speech, journalism, protest, and academic collaboration.
- Suspicion-less border powers and constructive knowledge elements could lead to arbitrary detention or profiling.
- Diplomatic immunity limits prosecutions; closed proceedings raise fairness concerns.
- Lack of defences for ordinary interactions or public information.
Outcomes and Effectiveness
The framework is described as “formidable” for deterrence, investigation, and prosecution, increasing risks for hostile actors. Early outcomes are positive but emerging, with prosecutorial discretion seen as a key safeguard against misuse. Public exposure of threats via courts could educate and deter.
Recommendations and Forward-Looking Statements
- Publish official statistics on powers’ use by a fixed date for transparency and monitoring.
- Strengthen defences (e.g., for reasonable beliefs or naïve cases), issue public guidance (e.g., on protests), and improve safeguards (e.g., custody visits, Code of Practice updates).
- Monitor for chilling effects on lawful activities and unjust outcomes.
- Future reviews (e.g., 2025) will assess progressing prosecutions and potential legislative tweaks.
Overall, the report concludes the NSA provides robust tools against state threats but requires vigilant application to balance security with civil liberties. It emphasises the need for ongoing scrutiny as case law develops.
