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Exchange Emergency Mitigation (EM) service

Yesterday I created a honeypot running Exchange 2019 in the lab. I configured very little and setup a test rule as per the MS blog to stop the SSRF from the “Autodiscover” endpoint to the Powershell function call. I put a custom response with some humour (coz why not!) but I disabled the rule:

This rule was placed in the Autodiscover virtual directory which in Exchange by default is here:

C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\autodiscover\web.config

My custom rule:

Read more

<rewrite>

<rules>

<rule name=”RequestBlockingRule1″ enabled=”false” patternSyntax=”Wildcard” stopProcessing=”true”>

<match url=”*” />

<conditions>

<add input=”{REQUEST_URI}” pattern=”.*autodiscover\.json.*\@.*Powershell.*” />

</conditions>

<action type=”CustomResponse” statusCode=”403″ statusReason=”No Hacks for You” statusDescription=”Say no to exploits!” />

</rule>

</rules>

</rewrite>

This morning I checked the Honeypot, and I found the following:

Graphical user interface, text, application, email

Description automatically generated

This rule is hosted in:

C:\inetpub\wwwroot\web.config

<rewrite>

<rules>

<rule name=”EEMS M1.1 PowerShell – inbound” stopProcessing=”true”>

<match url=”.*” />

<conditions>

<add input=”{REQUEST_URI}” pattern=”.*autodiscover\.json.*\@.*Powershell.*” />

</conditions>

<action type=”AbortRequest” />

</rule>

</rules>

</rewrite>

As you can see this was modified at 03:21 01/10/2022

Graphical user interface, text, application

Description automatically generated

This comes from:

Exchange Emergency Mitigation Service (Exchange EM Service) | Microsoft Learn

“Exchange Emergency Mitigation (EM) service”

Text

Description automatically generated

You can check if this is enabled by running the following PowerShell:

Add-PSSnapin Microsoft.Exchange.Management.PowerShell.SnapIn; 

Get-OrganizationConfig | Select-Object MitigationsEnabled

So here we can see that with this enabled, the Exchange server will download and deploy the HTTP re-write rules automatically (if the server has the required version/config etc.)

You can enable or disable it with the following:

Set-OrganizationConfig -MitigationsEnabled $true
Set-OrganizationConfig -MitigationsEnabled $false

You can check this feature works using the following (modify path as required for relevent exchange version)

. "C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\Scripts\Test-MitigationServiceConnectivity.ps1"

Check the MS docs and check your Exchange Server version to see if you have this feature etc.

GCM exsetup |%{$_.Fileversioninfo}

You learn something new everyday!

Exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Servers seen in the wild

LATEST UPDATE (04/10/2022)

The latest guidance from Microsoft (released on the 02/10/2022) says to disable administrators from being able to execute remote PowerShell via the exchange PowerShell web endpoint /PowerShell

Exchange Web Services in IIS

Customer Guidance for Reported Zero-day Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server – Microsoft Security Response Center

Read more

October 2, 2022 updates:

  • Added to the Mitigations section: we strongly recommend Exchange Server customers to disable remote PowerShell access for non-admin users in your organization. Guidance on how to do this for single user or multiple users is here.  
  • Updated Detection section to refer to Analyzing attacks using the Exchange vulnerabilities CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082.

Additional mitigations

  • Remove exchange web services from the internet (there are reasons to do and not do this)
  • Restrict hybrid servers to allow OWA to O365 only
  • Leverage dynamic blocking
  • Greynoise has a list of IPs known here: https://api.greynoise.io/v3/tags/8bf9b766-bf0f-452f-80bf-1d0903847793/ips?format=txt&token=rYZCpLOTf6UnUbBoUpF3Q

Obviously bear in mind this needs auth! but also auth isn’t always that hard..

Microsoft Research have just released (0825 30/09/2022) this: Customer Guidance for Reported Zero-day Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server – Microsoft Security Response Center

Microsoft have released a Exchange Server Emergency Mitigation (EMS) which includes URL re-write rules to HELP mitigate this (but likely don’t eliminate all risks due to potential bypasses)

New security feature in September 2021 Cumulative Update for Exchange Server – Microsoft Tech Community

Current Scenario (Updated 11:27 30/09/2022)

Likely “Zero day” exploit in the wild being used to attack exchange servers via a simmilar endpoint to ProxyShell. A mitigation is to apply URL rewrite rules, or to disconect the service internet from untrsuted networks until a patch is available. The Exploit is reported to required AUTHENTICATION, which may significantly limit the volume of exploitation (however credentials are only a phish away). It’s also reported the exploitation in the wild used /Powershell after exploiting the autodiscover endpoint.

Overview (orginal post area)

Yesterday it was reported there was a “new” zero day vulnerability being exploited in the wild. But there appears to be some confusion and a lack of speciifc evidence to showcase the vulnerability being “new” or simply being a differnt exploit path/approach for an existing CVE (e.g. ProxyShell).

The situation from my pov (at time of writing) is still unclear. It would be odd to not advise people ensure they are running the latest supported Exchange CU and Security update release (check both!) – if the exploits are 0-day (which it looks like they are) you will need to also patch when MS release a patch!

  • You may also wish to: use a WAF/Web Platform (IIS or reverse proxy) to restrict access to potentially vulnreable strings/endpoints.
  • You should probably review vendor guidance (Microsoft)
  • You may want to review your exchange servers for indicators of compromise (IOCs)
  • Check log files for activity, Check for dropped webshells, Check process logs (if you have them!)
  • Microsoft Recomends using the URL re-write module see (Customer Guidance for Reported Zero-day Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server – Microsoft Security Response Center

New Microsoft Exchange zero-days actively exploited in attacks (bleepingcomputer.com)

Upcoming | Zero Day Initiative

Upcoming | Zero Day Initiative

Warning: New attack campaign utilized a new 0-day RCE vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server | Blog | GTSC – Cung cấp các dịch vụ bảo mật toàn diện (gteltsc.vn)

Read more

Global Attack Surface

https://www.shodan.io/search/report?query=http.title%3Aoutlook+exchange

There are 201,995 Exchange Servers with Outlook Web Access Exposed (According to Shodan)

cve-2021-31206 (19,311)
https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31206

9.5% of the worlds Exchange attack surface is vulnerable to CVE-2021-31206

PROXYSHELL

https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2021/08/21/urgent-protect-against-active-exploitation-proxyshell

CVE-2021-34473 (4388)
CVE-2021-34523 (4388)
CVE-2021-31207 (4388)

2.1% of the worlds Exchange attack surface is vulnerable to ProxyShell CVEs (above) (based on the shodan data)

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/new-features/updates?view=exchserver-2019

Exchange CU Versions

IMPORTANT: Your NEED the LATEST Cummualative Update (CU) and the LATEST Security Updates (SU) for Exchange (and given this is a likely zero day scenario you will need to patch again when the latest patches are released from MS)

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/new-features/updates?view=exchserver-2019

Exchange 2019 CU12 Aug22SU

https://support.microsoft.com/en-gb/topic/description-of-the-security-update-for-microsoft-exchange-server-2019-and-2016-august-9-2022-kb5015322-86c06afb-97df-4d8f-af88-818419db8481

Exchange 2016 CU 23 Aug22SU

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/Exchange/new-features/build-numbers-and-release-dates?view=exchserver-2019

https://support.microsoft.com/en-gb/topic/description-of-the-security-update-for-microsoft-exchange-server-2019-and-2016-august-9-2022-kb5015322-86c06afb-97df-4d8f-af88-818419db8481

Exchange Server 2013 CU23 Aug22SU

https://support.microsoft.com/en-gb/topic/description-of-the-security-update-for-microsoft-exchange-server-2013-august-9-2022-kb5015321-96a47598-09b7-43eb-98bb-76fdf906f265

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/confirmation.aspx?id=58392

Summary

The situation appears to be evolving, as always security vulnerabilities and in the wild exploitations can be a fast moving landscape, internet facing systems need suitable and adequate protections, that doesn’t include just exposing IIS on TCP 443 and walking away. It requires capabilities such as:

  • WAF/CDN
  • DoS/DDoS Defence Considerations
  • Logging and Alerting
  • Staff to monitor and respond
  • Secure Configurations
  • Antirivurs/Antimalware
  • Segemntation
  • Endpoint Detection and Response Capabilities (EDR)
  • Incident Response Planning
  • Threat Intelligence

and many more things!

This post is a fast publish and may contain errors and/or the situation may change. I’ll try and keep it updated.

CVE-2022-26809 – Critical Windows RPC Vulnerability

Vulnerability Information

RatingCritical
CVEcve-2022-26809
MITRECVE – CVE-2022-26809 (mitre.org)
CVSSCVSS:3.1 9.8
ImpactRemote Code Execution (RCE)
Exploit in the wildCurrently not observed
Difficulty to Exploit (if PoC available)Very Low
Network PositionTCP/IP Routable or Network Adjacent
Authentication Required to ExploitNo
AffectedWindows Client/Server OS
Typical Service PortsTCP 135,139,445
Vendor Patch AvailableYes
Exploitable in Default OOB (out of the box) configurationUnknown
Exploitable Client/ServerBelieved to be client and server side exploitable
Read more “CVE-2022-26809 – Critical Windows RPC Vulnerability” →
Log4Shell

Log4Shell exploitation and hunting on VMware Horizon (CVE-2021-44228)

TLDR

Go and run this on the connection servers:

https://github.com/mr-r3b00t/CVE-2021-44228

It’s crude so also look for the modified timestamps, recent unexpected blast service restarts and if you have process logging go and check for suspicious child processes over the period. Once you have checked, run a backup, then if they aren’t patched, patch the servers! (i know patching isn’t as simple as just patch!)

Read more “Log4Shell exploitation and hunting on VMware Horizon (CVE-2021-44228)” →

CVE-2021-22005 – vCenter RCE

Introduction

Protecting admin interfaces is a really good idea, network segmentation however is one thing that many organisations struggle with. Most networks are what we call flat. They may be carved up into VLANs but generally speaking, in a lot of networks if you are “inside” then you have full access across the TCP/IP space.

Now here we are talking about the internal attack surface, so a threat actor would need network routable access which should not be the case for things like vcenter interfaces from the internet, however it appears that’s not really exactly how the world works.

Let’s look in Shodan! Read more “CVE-2021-22005 – vCenter RCE” →

Exchange Emergency Mitigation Service with new CU Update

This is a big thing in the Exchange world from my POV! I believe this is dropping sometime today (28th September!)

History

Exchange OWA, ECP etc. are exposed online not only for mailbox access, calendar sharing but also are a requirement for hybrid mode sync capabilities.

Vulnerabilities in Exchange this year (ProxyLogon/ProxyShell) have shown how problematic an attack surface this is. The good news is, Microsoft have created a feature for Exchange to help mitigate these attacks in the future via the EM Service!

Read more “Exchange Emergency Mitigation Service with new CU Update” →

Vulnerability Management – Actually doing it!

Vulnerability Management, Assessments and Vulnerability scanning is sometimes treated a with distain in the Offensive security community, I personally don’t understand that. Vulnerability management is key to inputting into security strategy, architecture, and operations. It’s coupled heavily to many other processes such as:

  • Asset Management
  • Risk Management
  • Patch Management
  • Change & Release Management
  • Security Testing
  • Security Monitoring

Before we start deploying let’s think about some areas for consideration when performing vulnerability scans:

  • Scope
    • Asset/Hosts
      • IP Ranges
      • Hostnames
    • Connectivity
      • VPNs
      • LAN/WAN
    • Device Types and Configuration
      • Domain
      • Workgroup
      • Appliance
      • ICS
      • Printers
      • Network Equipment
    • Unauthenticated View
    • Authenticated View
      • Auth Types
      • Protocols
    • Scheduling
    • Authority to execute
  • Impact
    • Performance
    • Availability
    • Confidentiality
  • Objectives and Outcomes
  • Reporting
    • Information Flow
    • Report Storage and Confidentiality

Read more “Vulnerability Management – Actually doing it!” →

A picture containing text, electronics, monitor, indoor Description automatically generated

Razer Privilege Escalation Vulnerability

“And I looked and behold a pale horse: and his name that sat on him was Death, and Hell followed with him.”

Firstly, Kudos to @j0nh4t for finding this!

I woke up this morning to see twitter fun with a LPE discovered in the Razer driver installation. Basically, when you plug a Razer mouse into a Windows machine, it will download (via windows update) and execute a process as system which has user interaction. This interface includes an install path selector, with this a right click + SHIFT (LULZ) on whitespace will allow you to launch a command prompt/PowerShell window (as SYSTEM).

A black shoe on a wood surface

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

A picture containing text, electronics, monitor, indoor

Description automatically generated Read more “Razer Privilege Escalation Vulnerability” →

Why are ransomware attacks so devastating? – Part 1

Introduction

“Ransomware is a major issue!”

Hang on maybe we need to re-phrase that:

“Weak security postures are a major issue!”

or perhaps.. why not both!

I’ve been working with digital technology management for over 20 years, I started out when I was a kid (literally) fixing people’s PCs in their offices, removing malware, improving configurations, writing batch file menus, and playing games. As time has gone on technology has shrunk and continually become more and more of our everyday lives.

Back in 2003 I responded internally to MSBlaster, an SMB worm that had a devastating effect for the time, by today’s standards it was child play, however I remember saying “it’s a good job it didn’t delete everything whilst it was here.” (Or something very similar. Post NACHI/Blaster my friends and I were talking about how worse it could get. Fast forward in time and it’s much worse. Yet when I look at networks, they don’t look very different to how they did back in the 2000s.

Despite a multi-billion-dollar cyber security industry, it seems daily that organisations are succumbing to “cyber-attacks” which commonly include ransomware. Why are they successful and why are they so impactful? Well, let’s take a look! Read more “Why are ransomware attacks so devastating? – Part 1” →

Dumping Credentails with MIMIKATZ and Passing the Hash (PTH)

I kid you not, I forget the commands, so I thought, hey let’s write a small blog post on credential dumping and pass the hash.

To achieve this we need: Debug privileges on a single machine or we need access to a disk that does not have full disk encryption. We also need the password to be re-used.

Mimikatz

Ok for this demo I’m going to run with the out of the box release for Mimikatz on a domain joined windows PC with Defender disabled.

To gain system we launch mimikatz from an admin shell and run:

privilege::debug

token::elevate

Now we are SYSTEM we access a range of high privilege level areas. Read more “Dumping Credentails with MIMIKATZ and Passing the Hash (PTH)” →

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