Tag: Risk

Defence

The Director of GCHQ speaks at CyberUK 2022

Sir Jeremy Fleming was speaking at CyberUK, the UK’s flagship cyber security conference this week.

The full presentation is here but I’ve picked out some key highlights.

“Of course, we can count ourselves lucky compared to those caught up in wars, but we are also seeing a heightened cyber risk. Cyber criminals are consistently evolving their tactics; the lines are blurring with hostile state activity and ransomware remains a real threat.”

“Cyber clearly matters to everyone.”

“At the global level, the UK has developed as a cyber power. Alongside the more traditional forms of diplomacy and statecraft, cyber now plays a vital role in our national security and prosperity.”

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Leadership

Security Myths and Bad Advice

It must be good, someone posted about it on LinkedIn!

Ok this isn’t my normal jam, normally I’d just write something that’s hopefully good advice/practise and that would be that. But today let’s try something different!

This was inspired by a twitter convo which evolved into this: https://twitter.com/UK_Daniel_Card/status/1522138771789123584?s=20&t=dL9OkicTY2Orj5hfBtDvVQ

So… what are some cyber security myths that ended up being good practise or “good advice”? Well here’s what I came up with, supported by some awesome cyber community people!

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Leadership

Cyber Events vs Incident vs Attack

Cyber Events

Yesterday I was asked about “attack volumes” I see in the PwnDefend HoneyNet and it reminded me about what people think an “ATTACK” is and therefore spring my brain into thinking about how we as an industry communicate. Far too often I see “number of ATTACKS” being used my marketing/sales etc. where the numbers are simply ridiculous and not reflective of how offensive cyber operations actually work.

Let’s look at some examples:

“Gov. Greg Abbott warns Texas agencies seeing 10,000 attempted cyber attacks per minute from Iran”

Gov. Greg Abbott – article in the Texas Tribune by CASSANDRA POLLOCK
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Leadership

Tabletop: “you have 400 servers; 800 users and your…

CISO Tabletop Scenario Intro

I thought it would be fun to explore what people do with regards to Cyber Securityleadeship, budgets, contraints and realities of business change. So here’s a blog post to supliment my thread on twitter:

MrR3b00t | #StandWithUkraine #DefendAsOne on Twitter: “Tabletop: you have 400 servers, 800 users and your cyber security budget is 100K…. what do you do? https://t.co/Nw0Pd7rH8L” / Twitter

please note: the list below is based on experiance, it’s also a list I made whilst drinking about half a cup of tea so it’s not complete or “the answer” it’s just some observations about an approach I advocate.

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Leadership

Why do “we” suck so badly at digital security…

Everything is fine until it’s not

I’ve been travelling to different organisations and visiting different networks for a while and whilst each organisation is unique (they really are) their operating models, technology challenges and weak security postures generally aren’t as unique as the organisational itself.

One thing that does spring to mind however is that there is a massively common pattern we find with organisations.

  • Those that invest well have better postures, better technology experiences and an improved security posture.
  • Those that don’t historically invest well, well they have quite the opposite:
    • They don’t train staff
    • They have very weak postures
    • They carry an extraordinary volume of business risk

One thing that is common though, is that all of this tends to link to financial investments, so executives and boards usually have some idea if they are spending or not in this space, what they commonly don’t have a good view on is they getting what they “thought they were buying”. Sadly, too often what they assumed was “in the box” with the “IT provision” with regards to quality and cyber security just simply isn’t the case. Everything is fine, until you look… then it’s less than fine! So, what can we do about it?

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Defense

CVE-2022-26809 – Critical Windows RPC Vulnerability

Vulnerability Information

RatingCritical
CVEcve-2022-26809
MITRECVE – CVE-2022-26809 (mitre.org)
CVSSCVSS:3.1 9.8
ImpactRemote Code Execution (RCE)
Exploit in the wildCurrently not observed
Difficulty to Exploit (if PoC available)Very Low
Network PositionTCP/IP Routable or Network Adjacent
Authentication Required to ExploitNo
AffectedWindows Client/Server OS
Typical Service PortsTCP 135,139,445
Vendor Patch AvailableYes
Exploitable in Default OOB (out of the box) configurationUnknown
Exploitable Client/ServerBelieved to be client and server side exploitable
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Leadership

Cyber Realities: Impacts of Cyber to Business

Introduction

This post stated out as a technical post about commonalities found in the field that vary based on business operating model, IT capability and vectors used by threat actors. Whilst writing this it led more into business leadership, governance and investment risks. How do these two subjects’ interface? Well to be honest they are the same thing from a different lens.

In this post we are going to look at:

  • Common Technology Deployment Models and the associated threats/risks/vulnerabilities
  • Common challenges I find in organisations
  • And finally, a question… is this the business outcome that you want
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Architecture

The difference between what can be vs what often…

I’ve travelled all over the internet, I’ve worked with logs of organisations from banks through to small ISVs and one thing I would say is fairly universally true. What can be isn’t what is.

There’s a lot of different operating models and technologies in the world. There’s logs of differen’t specifics. This diagram here is not mean’t as a refrence architecture but more as an indicator.

There is also a massive reality people must understand, cyber good most definatley costs more at the point of deployment than cyber bad. Cyber bad’s ROI is truly variable and in mind mind is too hard to measure. For one org with cyber bad can experiance a significant breach (and cost) and another may have lady luck on their side.

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