Did you want to check out some of your detections? This isn’t everything of course but it’s a simple batch file to simulate a range of enumeration techniques used by actors like CONTI or LOCKBIT affiliates/operators:
Read more “Simulating Human Operated Discovery”
breaking news: Royal mails international tracking services are down and have been for > 24 hours:
The ICO have been contacted! The NCSC and NCA have been contacted! What should you do?
Read more “Royal Mail Cyber Attack! What should you do?”
When an organisation suffers a data breach it’s usually bad. When an organisation that stores 25 million people’s passwords that’s really bad.
There are multiple risks here at play.
Firstly, when we give people our data, it’s our risk and our choice. I’m ok with that, I chose to give lastPass my data.
My vault data might be gone, but I have a strong master password, how we interpreted the theft of the basically cryptographic materials is a bit like when we full disk encrypt a drive.
If you lose a laptop that’s got FDE do you report this as a data loss to the ICO? Or do you say, it’s encrypted so actually I haven’t lost the data per say, I’ve just lost a random (ish) bunch of 0s an 1s so I don’t count that as an incident? I’m not here to be judge or jury.
Read more “LastPass Breach – The danger of metadata”
We’ve all been there haven’t we! We’ve pwn3d a network, pivoted and moved around for months and then accidentally got the wrong company name… oh wait.
Well, this story isn’t fiction, CLOP ransomware group have breached a water company and then written it up as the wrong organisation. Read more “CLOP Ransomware Group Breaches Water Company and then misattributes to THAMES WATER”
When running honeypots you never have to wait too long for something to drop!
This moring we had a new hit in the pot, so I decided to invesigate but also to blog and show how we could go about investigating the logs and paylods etc.
Read more “Learn to SOC: Java Webshell via confluence”
We are seeing active exploitation in the wild: MIRAI deployment, coinminer deployments etc.
THIS DOES SHOW IN THE ACCESS LOGS! The comment about “what isn’t in the logs” is about POST request BODY not showing in them, not that nothing is logged
XMRIG, KINSING, MIRAI etc. are being deployed by threat actors after exploiting this vulnerability.
This is a fast publish
POC is in the wild: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/06/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-cve-2022-26134/
https://github.com/jbaines-r7/through_the_wire
keep checking vendor guidance and keep checking this for updates… use at own risk etc.
Workaround/Hotfixes have been published by Atlassian:
https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html
https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-79000
GreyNoise Tag is online: GreyNoise Trends
Also check this out for scanners: GreyNoise
Nice work https://twitter.com/_mattata and all the other people in the cyber community that are working on this!
IT MAY BE WISE TO ASSUME BREACH
The vulnerability appears to be in: xwork-1.0.3-atlassian-10.jar
Velocity discovers a zero-day in confluence 03/06/2022 (GMT)
This is an evolving post and will likely be updated over time. Online “community” or “criminal gangs” etc. can be fluin and dynamic, thinking of them in rigid structures and trying to compare them to “In Real Life (IRL)” organisationas directly doesn’t really work. They work generally in a collective fashion. No masters and no slaves etc.
I don’t really like to use the term “hacker” in this sense, perhaps hacktivist or criminal groups is the right fit, however, words aside there is the question: Who is KILLNET, are they a threat and who are they a threat to?
KILLNET was suposedly formed as a resonse to the IT ARMY of Ukraine (Ukraine Cybe Army) (formed late Feb) which is odd given the first post from KILLNET was on January the 23rd and IT ARMY of UKRAINE setup their telegram on Feb 26th.
Read more “KILLNET: Area they really a threat?”
OPSEC is hard! Doing things that are covert is expensive and time consuming. Being invisible in today’s digital age is very hard. Operating covertly in plain sight it also hard.
Everything about this “stuff” is hard, except sometimes maybe it’s just viewed as “it’s hard and expensive” so why even bother, or conversely… maybe the objective can be “we want people to know it was us.”
Either way there’s some interesting reading if we look at “cyber” and “opsec”. For the minute I’ve just started to collect a list of links to articles which show some of the ways opsec failures have occurred in the past in relation to the GRU.
Read more “OPSEC is Hard: Are you even trying?”
| Rating | Critical |
| CVE | cve-2022-26809 |
| MITRE | CVE – CVE-2022-26809 (mitre.org) |
| CVSS | CVSS:3.1 9.8 |
| Impact | Remote Code Execution (RCE) |
| Exploit in the wild | Currently not observed |
| Difficulty to Exploit (if PoC available) | Very Low |
| Network Position | TCP/IP Routable or Network Adjacent |
| Authentication Required to Exploit | No |
| Affected | Windows Client/Server OS |
| Typical Service Ports | TCP 135,139,445 |
| Vendor Patch Available | Yes |
| Exploitable in Default OOB (out of the box) configuration | Unknown |
| Exploitable Client/Server | Believed to be client and server side exploitable |
Go and run this on the connection servers:
https://github.com/mr-r3b00t/CVE-2021-44228
It’s crude so also look for the modified timestamps, recent unexpected blast service restarts and if you have process logging go and check for suspicious child processes over the period. Once you have checked, run a backup, then if they aren’t patched, patch the servers! (i know patching isn’t as simple as just patch!)
Read more “Log4Shell exploitation and hunting on VMware Horizon (CVE-2021-44228)”