WP2SHELL

Yesterday afternoon/early evening a patch for WordPress was released (7.0.2) which address two vulnerabilities which are named: WP2SHELL. This is a fast post (largely generated by Claude Opus) to provide some detail. For reference in our research we have found ~20% of WordPress sites still vulnerable as of a few hours ago (based on a sample), so this is a live scenario and it would be strongly advisable for organisations to take appropriate steps. This morning I’ve built a docker lab of a vulnerable WordPress site and demonstrated hash theft and web shell deployment to a vulnerable lab instance.

I’ve put some resources for people (use at own risk) into a repo: https://github.com/mr-r3b00t/wp2shell/

that includes a scanner, some info on the vulns and a PoC tool!

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Bleeding Out

When you compromise a firewall you have lots of options in terms of next steps, from using the VPN, changing configurations, creating backdoors or perhaps using the firewall to PCAP. In this post I’m going to explore the ‘Fortibleed’ campaign. I have to note, we can see in honeypot logs this TA did not seem to limit themselves to Fortinet exploitation, however the area of analysis has a heavy Fortinet element. You will see they deployed a capture and analysis platform. Treat everything with a pinch of salt because I’m using a mad probability based machine (LLM) to support me for this!

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Fortibleed

In the ‘world of Mythos’ and other such overhyped AI buzz words…. the fundamentals of digital security still apply. Don’t get me wrong, I think LLMs are great, as a digital defender, I’ve been using LLMs relatively for a long time now (from offence to defence to general CTI/Research) so I’m not a hater, they are like an Iron Man suit! But we still need our Tony Stark and Pepper Potts!

It’s very easy in a world full of complexity to oversimplify, it’s very easy to focus on one class of threat and ignore another. Zero days sound cool, when mass exploration occurs, it’s a real problem, but for the day to day in an org, authentication attacks (identity plane) are the number one thing you will likely be seeing (if you look at our logs… you have logs right???)

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cPanel Vulnerability Exploited ITW

Mass iternet exploitation events are never fun, this week we have CVE-2026-41940 being exploited! Luckily we have the awesome and cool honeypots at Defused to help us investigate threat actor activity! So let’s take a look! (there’s a good writeup here from Watchtowr.

Kill Chain

We have used ‘AI’ (Claude) to create a timeline based on packets from Defused honeypots:

What did Claude say?

I exported the logs from the Defused honeypot TI feed focused on a single IP then imported that include a chat with Claude:


Here’s the breakdown of what the data shows:

Attack summary — CVE-2026-41940 against a cPanel honeypot

The attacker at 80.87.206.131 ran a structured, two-wave exploitation chain over approximately 22 minutes. The CVE pattern maps to a known cPanel authentication bypass class: forge a session via the preauth endpoint, propagate it through a cache gadget, then leverage the resulting authenticated context to make privileged JSON-API calls.

Wave 1 (06:36–06:37) was a minimal two-step probe — session mint followed immediately by a single cache propagation attempt. This is consistent with tooling running an initial reachability check before committing to full exploitation.

Wave 2 (06:57–06:58) is the main effort. The attacker repeated the session mint, fired the cache gadget twice (likely confirming propagation), and within 9 seconds of the second gadget request had transitioned to authenticated API calls — specifically authorizesshkey (SSH key injection) and listaccts (account enumeration). The two events timestamped 06:58:28suggest either a scripted burst or the tooling executing the auth’d phase in parallel.

Key indicators for hunting:

  • POST /login/?login_only=1 as the session mint vector
  • GET /scripts2/listaccts as the cache gadget trigger
  • Rapid pivot to /json-api/ endpoints within seconds of gadget confirmation
  • 20-minute gap between waves is characteristic of automated tooling with a callback/retry loop

Worth checking whether 80.87.206.131 appears in any other decoy logs — the structured cadence strongly suggests an automated exploit kit rather than manual operation.


We can see here, the exploit here is very simple, POST then a GET followed by API access!

Not only do we now have data to write detections from, we can also look at creating a PoC for penetration testing and vulnerability assessment purposes! A double win! This really goes to show how valuable honeypots can be from a broad TI perspective as well as supporting defence and offence!

A double edged sword (or pot?), like so many things in life!

Suggested Actions to take

  • Check if you or your hosting providers run CPANEL
  • Check for compromise (or request intel from a partner)
  • If no compromise detected patch the server
    • if you can’t patch consider using an IP allow list/VPN or other method to shield access from anywhere on the internet (you might want to do this even if you have patched)
  • If compromised follow your incident repsonse process

Each scenario is different so I’ll not try and tell everyone exactly what they should do here, the key point of this blog is to highlight the vulnerability, the threat/risk so people can take the appropriate steps.

Also, you probably want to check out the honeypots at Defused! They are awesome!

[update] just found this in the packets: H2ckt3ch@g0dl1k3 (cm9vdDpIMmNrdDNjaEBnMGRsMWsz is the BASE64). I won’t publish all the packets right now (because that probably won’t help this early on) but this string was interesting…

Cyber Attack on Poland’s Electric System 2025

This week there’s been a lot of activity on reporting on a compromise which occurred in 2025 in Poland.

I’m neck deep inside some project work so I don’t have time to pour over this but I did spent a few minutes prompting GROK.

“On December 29, 2025, Poland experienced a coordinated and destructive cyber attack targeting its electric grid, specifically focusing on distributed energy resources (DERs) such as more than 30 wind farms, solar (photovoltaic) installations, and one major combined heat and power (CHP) plant that supplies heat to nearly half a million residents. The assault, which occurred amid harsh winter weather including low temperatures and snowstorms, exploited vulnerabilities like exposed FortiGate firewalls/VPNs lacking multi-factor authentication, default or weak credentials on devices (e.g., Hitachi RTUs, Mikronika controllers), and poor network segmentation. Attackers gained access to operational technology (OT) systems, deploying wiper malware (including variants like DynoWiper and LazyWiper), overwriting disks, deleting files, resetting configurations, and uploading corrupted firmware to “brick” certain hardware—resulting in permanent field-level impairment and complete loss of remote monitoring and control at affected sites. Despite these actions, no power outages or heat supply disruptions occurred, thanks to the grid’s coal-heavy inertia, resilient generation continuity, and partial mitigations such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) blocking wipers in the CHP environment.

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Administrator:password

Imagine this, you setup a server and it has a really weak administrator password! Now let’s imagine you expose RDP to the internet. How long would it take to get pw3nd?

Well we did this, using a custom configuration to make this safe, we setup a Windows Server, setup an administrator account with the password of ‘password’ and monitored the logs! So let’s see what we found.

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