Cybercrime

When the negotiators go bad!

Every ransomware incident runs on one uncomfortable assumption: that the people you bring in to help are actually on your side. A case that concluded in a Florida federal court this month blew a hole straight through that assumption. Three cyber professionals — two of them ransomware negotiators whose day job was to defend victims — have been sentenced for working as an affiliate crew of the ALPHV/BlackCat operation. One of them didn’t just moonlight as an attacker; he sold out the very clients who were paying him to protect them.

This is not another “big scary ransomware gang” story. It’s an insider-threat story, and it lands right in the middle of the incident-response industry itself. If you run an IR practice, negotiate on behalf of victims, broker cyber insurance, or you’re a CISO who will one day have to trust one of these firms on the worst day of your career — this one is worth your time.

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Threat Intel

Cyber Attack on Poland’s Electric System 2025

This week there’s been a lot of activity on reporting on a compromise which occurred in 2025 in Poland.

I’m neck deep inside some project work so I don’t have time to pour over this but I did spent a few minutes prompting GROK.

“On December 29, 2025, Poland experienced a coordinated and destructive cyber attack targeting its electric grid, specifically focusing on distributed energy resources (DERs) such as more than 30 wind farms, solar (photovoltaic) installations, and one major combined heat and power (CHP) plant that supplies heat to nearly half a million residents. The assault, which occurred amid harsh winter weather including low temperatures and snowstorms, exploited vulnerabilities like exposed FortiGate firewalls/VPNs lacking multi-factor authentication, default or weak credentials on devices (e.g., Hitachi RTUs, Mikronika controllers), and poor network segmentation. Attackers gained access to operational technology (OT) systems, deploying wiper malware (including variants like DynoWiper and LazyWiper), overwriting disks, deleting files, resetting configurations, and uploading corrupted firmware to “brick” certain hardware—resulting in permanent field-level impairment and complete loss of remote monitoring and control at affected sites. Despite these actions, no power outages or heat supply disruptions occurred, thanks to the grid’s coal-heavy inertia, resilient generation continuity, and partial mitigations such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) blocking wipers in the CHP environment.

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Threat Intel

Analysing 1 Million Honeypot events with Defused Cyber Deception

A common perimeter firewall in organisations is the CISCO ASA. Back when I started in the industry we used to have CISCO PIX firewalls, the ASA was the next generation of these! Why is this important? Well its important to understand how common threat actors work, you will see from a while ago I wrote a review of the manual 2.0 by Bassterlord (a known cybercriminal), this is to help understand how attackers work, what real world cybercrime looks like so that we can enable people to help defend against these threats.

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