
Office 365/Azure Pentest Tools
I’m not going to talk about these… yet… and there’s duplicates because I think it’s useful to see where they can be used in different scenarios. Expect this list to grow!
Read more “Office 365/Azure Pentest Tools”I’m not going to talk about these… yet… and there’s duplicates because I think it’s useful to see where they can be used in different scenarios. Expect this list to grow!
Read more “Office 365/Azure Pentest Tools” →Whilst conducting security testing and assurance activities, I went looking to show logon events in Office 365. My first query was on IdentityEvents, this led to a view of a multi month attack by a threat actor/s against a tenent, followed by exploring the rabbit hole of logs and computer systems. This blog summarises some of the methods and findings when considering threat hunting and authentication defences for Office 365. (bear with me I am tired so this might need a bit of a tune up later!)
Read more “Defending Against Direct Authentication Attacks in Microsoft Office 365” →I’ve been working with all kinds of different organisations over the years, and I keep running into similar scenarios. The current state of the majority of organisations security postures are simply (as a broad-brush statement) far riskier than they need to be.
Conversely there are a range of common challenges I find in almost every org:
Read more “The Cyber Acid Test” →Can you lose maybe 25 million peoples vaults and still claim to be a secure secret management company? Does that even fly? Does it matter that you lose all the metadata (IP access logs), URLs and vast amounts of other metdata but don’t worry ~5 fields are encrypted so as long as your master password is never cracked… yawn…
When an organisation suffers a data breach it’s usually bad. When an organisation that stores 25 million people’s passwords that’s really bad.
There are multiple risks here at play.
Firstly, when we give people our data, it’s our risk and our choice. I’m ok with that, I chose to give lastPass my data.
My vault data might be gone, but I have a strong master password, how we interpreted the theft of the basically cryptographic materials is a bit like when we full disk encrypt a drive.
If you lose a laptop that’s got FDE do you report this as a data loss to the ICO? Or do you say, it’s encrypted so actually I haven’t lost the data per say, I’ve just lost a random (ish) bunch of 0s an 1s so I don’t count that as an incident? I’m not here to be judge or jury.
Read more “LastPass Breach – The danger of metadata” →A winning cyber security strategy should have several key components.
First, it should involve a thorough assessment of your organization’s current security posture, including identifying any potential vulnerabilities or weaknesses. This assessment should be ongoing, with regular updates to ensure that your security measures are keeping pace with the evolving threat landscape.
Read more “What is a “Winning Cyber Security Strategy”?” →Have you every tried to understand the risk level of a service? Ever wanted to provide assurance to someone that “it’s been well designed, is secure from common threats, likely risk scenarios and is securely operated” etc.? have you ever tried to conduct testing against a service that is relatively unknown? Ever needed to actually do more than throw some packets at the front door? Guess what, I have. Most orgs don’t have a decent level of documentation on service architecture and security controls. And as the NSA nicely put, the way they get into networks is to know them better than you do! So in my travels I see lots of different orgs and largely there’s one common similarity, most of them aren’t well documented (docs are boring right!) and if we then make another huge sweeping generalisation, about 90% of orgs have security postures you wouldn’t want to have to defend as a blue teamer, but you might fancy if you were a nation state actor or cyber criminal!
Read more “Service Security Architecture and Assurance” →I’ve waked around one of two organisations, across a load of verticals and well I see people post things online about common technology generalisations and frankly it sometimes leaves me wondering what networks they have been in, but also am I just on another planet? So, I thought I would jot down some notes on common tech I see in orgs during my business travels but also on in the ciberz! It’s not a list of everything I see, it’s just what appears in my head as quite bloody common.
Read more “Enterprise Technology Generalisations” →A mRr3b00t Adventure
Join me on an adventure of rambling and exploring the idea that you can in fact not lose the security leadership game! This blog is WIP, it’s just my brain wondering around the question of: can we win the in the face of a seemingly insurmountable force? What do we do as a security leader to protect ourselves and the organisation? How do we start?
Read more “How to not lose your job as a CISO” →I am seeing lots of “debate” about the value in red teaming, so I thought I would put together my thought process of how I look at as a broad stroke when I consider a generic starting position in an organisation. When I’m defending a business, I tend to ask myself (and the team/customers etc.) these kind of questions (they are not exhaustive):
Read more “Red Team Readiness Assessment” →