Forensics
Scope: Where each component writes logs, what it records, what it doesn’t, defaults, and the forensic/detection implications for the lab. Basis: Verified against the running lab (Ollama 0.32.1 on the Windows host + remote 3090; Agent Zero container, Kali-based image). Paths/behaviors confirmed live where noted.
Read more “Logging Reference — Ollama & Agent Zero”
AI
Imagine building what you describe as the most powerful AI enabled cyber tool…. and then showing the world that you put it in a lab where a single box compromise led to it having unrestricted and unmonitored internet access… that would be awkward would it not? Here’s an LLMs take on this…
Read more “If it’s so powerful, it’s a shame you didn’t use it for defense design”
Research
What better way to test than to eat ones own dogfood right! This site runs WordPress, it is fronted by Cloudflare, has wordfence and has automatic patching enabled (the default) in WordPress. So what better example to show that we can use an LLM + LLM created scripts to conduct assurance activities. This is mixing deterministic and non deterministic technologies to test and then assess.
Read more “Using an LLM for assurance (WP2SHELL)”
Strategy
TL;DR: wp2shell (CVE-2026-63030 chained with CVE-2026-60137) matters because it is a core, pre-authentication RCE reachable on a stock, plugin-free install. That is the rare category. In 25 years, unauthenticated code execution against a bare WordPress install has happened only a handful of times. The overwhelming majority of WordPress mass compromise has ridden the plugin and theme supply chain and infrastructure abuse, not core. This post maps the history so you can see where wp2shell actually sits.
Read more “From TimThumb to wp2shell: 25 Years of WordPress Mass Exploitation”
Vulnerabilities
This morning I’ve started to see exploitation attempts on pwndefend.com (they all failed because like about 80% of sites (based on sampling) this site automatically patched, but also, this site has word fence, is fronted by Cloudflare.
On the 18th (AM) I did sampling of about 3.5K hosts and found ~20% were not patched. The cyber apocalypse is not seemingly here today! (let alone the fact that if every WordPress site was popped, the world would probably not end)
Read more “WP2SHELL Update”
Threat Intel
In the ‘world of Mythos’ and other such overhyped AI buzz words…. the fundamentals of digital security still apply. Don’t get me wrong, I think LLMs are great, as a digital defender, I’ve been using LLMs relatively for a long time now (from offence to defence to general CTI/Research) so I’m not a hater, they are like an Iron Man suit! But we still need our Tony Stark and Pepper Potts!
It’s very easy in a world full of complexity to oversimplify, it’s very easy to focus on one class of threat and ignore another. Zero days sound cool, when mass exploration occurs, it’s a real problem, but for the day to day in an org, authentication attacks (identity plane) are the number one thing you will likely be seeing (if you look at our logs… you have logs right???)
Read more “Fortibleed”
Leadership
Our cyber world is full of myths and FUD:
Attackers only have to be right once, Defenders have to be right all the time!
Firstly, let’s cut straight to the chase, I can only assume that someone who says this is ignoring or is unaware of how computer systems and intrusions work. But surely this is a true phrase, I’ve seen it repeated over and over again on LinkedIn, so it must be true right?
Read more “Cyber Myth: Attackers only have to be right once, Defenders have to be right all the time!”
Vulnerabilities
Ok, fun things to learn about me, I don’t like CVEs or CVSS because my brain can’t really read them! I have the same challenge with some server naming standards. I need something like SRV-UK-ADDS-01 if it’s not goy hyphens I need a tool to read them for me! (true story!). So lets look at CVSS (I know I’m full of fun topics).
Read more “CVSS Scoring is fun they said!”
Leadership
Most organizations treat email authentication as a checkbox exercise. Deploy SPF, publish DMARC in reporting mode, call it done. But the real story isn’t about maturity tiers—it’s about what you unlock at each phase of implementation. And frankly, the gap between where organizations are and where they need to be is brutal.
This post outlines an enablement journey: each phase builds on the previous one and creates new capabilities that weren’t possible before.
Read more “Email Security: An Enablement Journey, Not a Maturity Ladder”
Research
A position snapshot of the full Majestic Million across three layers — DNSSEC signing, email authentication (SPF / DMARC / MTA-STS), and DANE. This is the scorecard: what is deployed, on how many domains, and how it’s distributed by rank and TLD. Remember Majestic Million is a bit old so a chunk of the domains no longer resolve, but the data gives a good thematic view.
Read more “The State of DNS Security — Where the Top Million Stands: DNSSEC, Email Authentication & DANE by the Numbers”