Security – Page 2

Detecting ‘Dark Tunnels’ with Microsoft Defender using KQL

Detecting ‘Dark Tunnels’ is an important element to corporate security, much like detecting unauthorised RMM usage. But what is a dark tunnel?

according to GROK:

A dark tunnel (sometimes called a “dark pool tunnel” or simply a secure reverse tunnel in networking contexts) refers to a type of secure, outbound-only tunneling technology that allows private access to internal services, devices, or networks without exposing them to the public internet. The “dark” aspect emphasizes that the tunnel is hidden or invisible from external scanners—there’s no inbound port forwarding, firewall holes, or public IP exposure required. Instead, it relies on encrypted outbound connections from the internal resource to a cloud-based relay or peer-to-peer mesh, enabling zero-trust access (e.g., via authentication tokens or keys).
This approach is popular in DevOps, IoT, remote work, and cybersecurity for bridging on-premises or edge devices to the cloud securely, often bypassing NAT traversal issues or legacy VPN complexities.

Breach

Ransomware kill chains are boring.. will we ever learn?

Are we stuck in a cyber world that never learns? are we doomed to suffer the same fate over and over again? Well, not if you take action, you can totally prevent events like this!

This is a fast post using an LLM to analyse the Capita redacted ICO report. Hopefully it will help people think about things and take the lessons and apply them in their own organisations.

Education

A threat to sanity – Cyber Myth: Juice Jacking

“Juice jacking” has become a modern cybersecurity myth — a catchy scare story built on a long-patched Android debugging issue and fueled by viral fear rather than facts. Despite years of warnings, there are no confirmed cases of real-world juice jacking attacks; the cost, effort, and low reward make it an impractical method for criminals. Yet the myth persists because it’s vivid, simple, and scary — everything our brains latch onto. The real danger is not the USB port at the airport, but the distraction such myths create. When people focus on imaginary threats, they waste precious attention that should go toward genuine risks like weak passwords, missing MFA, unpatched systems, and poor backups. So let’s take a bit of a deeper dive into this subject, because by it’s important to understand what to, and what not to focus on in my experience!

News

‘Secure’ Firewall backups, until they are not!

Firewalls are often both a defended gate but also the front door to access corporate network. That is all lovely until it’s not! You see so many corporate network intrusion incidents occur from threat actors simply logging into the VPN (due to lack of VPN), and then we have the software vulnerabilities where they shell their way in, but did you think that another way could be from stealing all the backups from a ‘security’ provider? Well now you might! There’s been bit of an incident (one that started as it’s only 5% of customers but actually it was 100% of customers who used the backup feature! YIKES), but before that let’s look at the typical landscape!

Threat Intel

Shiny Hunters / Scattered Spider Alleged Victims

Shiny Hunters/Scattered spider have published a leaked download site (DLS)/extortion site etc.
This is a fast publish with content mainly generated using an LLM (GROK). This appears to relate to victims who have been victims of social engineering, it does not appear to be related to the Salesforce, SalesLoft Drift breach: https://help.salesforce.com/s/articleView?id=005134951&type=1

Guides

Breaching WPA2 PSK Wireless Networks

This weekend I was running a workshop with my awesome friend James, where we were discussing the realities of wireless network security, man in the middle attacks and what we have found in the field, both from an offensive perspective and as corporate network defenders. As with all things in life, sometime reality doesn’t work quite as well as a demo! So I’ve done a quick thread on twitter showing the kill chain an adversary can deploy when attacking WPA2 PSK (without PMF enforced) networks. This is written as a twitter thread so bear with the style!

Education

Supporting the Cyber Leadership Challenge

Earlier this year I had the honour of supporting the Cyber Leadership Challenge as a judge at the BT Tower! I’ve been a judge at Cyber 912 previously but I’ve always been doing that virtually, so it was great to be able to goto the event not via a webcam! The Cyber Leadership challenge is a national cyber emergency competition for UK university students. The students work in teams through an evolving national major cyber incident, so they will likely be thinking through areas many don’t give two seconds thought to, such as:

Leadership

Cybercrime and data theft

During an incident it’s one of the first questions people ask, what did the attacker do? Did they steal any data? How did they do it?

All of which are typically rather difficult to answer in the first, probably week of an incident (incidents vary, sometimes it’s very obvious, other times you can’t be 100% sure on some details!)

But recently I’ve been talking lots about the way organisations communicate during incidents to their customers and the public etc. I’ve been explaining that the day 0 comms of ‘no data was stolen’ followed by a ‘lots of data was stolen’ in say day zero plus five… well it doesn’t help with my my trust in the victim organisation. Which to me, seems like an odd strategy for organisations to take. They have options:

Threat Intel

An evolution of threat actor

Motivation and a diverse network of people and capabilities can go a long way, then add in digital skills and winning steak… and you have: scattered spider!

There’s a big difference between zero day spraying the internet and planting webshells or copying someone’s open S3 bucket and say…. doxing staff, their families and attacking them and their assets in the real and digital worlds.

I think people won’t broadly grasp the effects that can be achieved (harm) when the adversary is motivated, dedicated, capable, resourced and has very little moral qualms.

There is no magic bullet to defend against an adversary like this, you need a whole of organisation defence (and to pursue even more than that!).

Threat Intel

Defending Against Scattered Spider

Defending against different skilled threat classes is an important thing to consider when you are planning, designing and operating a business. I’ve used GROK (AI) to create an html page which has both information on the kill chains, but also looks at countermeasures. I’m experimenting lots with VIBE coding and LLM assisted content generation so hopefully this proves useful. I do feel it needs a more human touch added as well… but let’s see! life without experimentation would be dull would it not!