Research

The State of DNS Security — Where the Top…

A position snapshot of the full Majestic Million across three layers — DNSSEC signing, email authentication (SPF / DMARC / MTA-STS), and DANE. This is the scorecard: what is deployed, on how many domains, and how it’s distributed by rank and TLD. Remember Majestic Million is a bit old so a chunk of the domains no longer resolve, but the data gives a good thematic view.

Read more “The State of DNS Security — Where the Top Million Stands: DNSSEC, Email Authentication & DANE by the Numbers”
Leadership

DNSSEC

‘You are totally compromised!’ because you don’t have DNSSEC configured on domain…..

The implication is that you’re one packet away from catastrophe. It’s alarming. It’s also, for the overwhelming majority of organisations, not true. I have been talking about this for years and years!

Here’s the quickest way to see through it. I scanned the Majestic Million – the top one million domains on the internet – for DNSSEC. About 6.75% were signed (around 8.2% if you only count domains that actually resolve). The .com zone, which is half the list, sits at 4.6%. And the unsigned set includes google.com, amazon.com and microsoft.com.

So if “no DNSSEC” means “totally compromised,” then the three most-attacked, best-defended companies on the planet are totally compromised, and have been for years, on purpose. They aren’t. The finding is measuring conformance to a checklist, not risk. Let’s understand why this is!

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Cybercrime

Using shame to enable extortion

When we look at ‘sextortion’ and ’email based extortion’ tactics used by threat actors we see a common pattern, one that leverages shame & fear. I’ve worked with some victims of this and it’s really not nice for them, the impacts are not just financial, they are emotional and sometimes more. It’s fortunately (for me) don’t however deal with this in volume, however I wanted to highlight something, the similarities between extortion and what I would describe as ‘Security Scanning’ shame scamming. Now you might think, that’s a massive leap… but bear with me, I’ve been looking at this (CTI/OSINT) plus working with ‘victims’ for years…

I’ll be posting about some research I’ve done on DNSSEC shortly too, I’ve kind of figured this topic was over years ago, but it’s recently come back on my radar, you know sometimes ‘duty calls’. But let’s look at shame based extortion patterns for now:

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Threat Intel

cPanel Vulnerability Exploited ITW

Mass iternet exploitation events are never fun, this week we have CVE-2026-41940 being exploited! Luckily we have the awesome and cool honeypots at Defused to help us investigate threat actor activity! So let’s take a look! (there’s a good writeup here from Watchtowr.

Kill Chain

We have used ‘AI’ (Claude) to create a timeline based on packets from Defused honeypots:

What did Claude say?

I exported the logs from the Defused honeypot TI feed focused on a single IP then imported that include a chat with Claude:


Here’s the breakdown of what the data shows:

Attack summary — CVE-2026-41940 against a cPanel honeypot

The attacker at 80.87.206.131 ran a structured, two-wave exploitation chain over approximately 22 minutes. The CVE pattern maps to a known cPanel authentication bypass class: forge a session via the preauth endpoint, propagate it through a cache gadget, then leverage the resulting authenticated context to make privileged JSON-API calls.

Wave 1 (06:36–06:37) was a minimal two-step probe — session mint followed immediately by a single cache propagation attempt. This is consistent with tooling running an initial reachability check before committing to full exploitation.

Wave 2 (06:57–06:58) is the main effort. The attacker repeated the session mint, fired the cache gadget twice (likely confirming propagation), and within 9 seconds of the second gadget request had transitioned to authenticated API calls — specifically authorizesshkey (SSH key injection) and listaccts (account enumeration). The two events timestamped 06:58:28suggest either a scripted burst or the tooling executing the auth’d phase in parallel.

Key indicators for hunting:

  • POST /login/?login_only=1 as the session mint vector
  • GET /scripts2/listaccts as the cache gadget trigger
  • Rapid pivot to /json-api/ endpoints within seconds of gadget confirmation
  • 20-minute gap between waves is characteristic of automated tooling with a callback/retry loop

Worth checking whether 80.87.206.131 appears in any other decoy logs — the structured cadence strongly suggests an automated exploit kit rather than manual operation.


We can see here, the exploit here is very simple, POST then a GET followed by API access!

Not only do we now have data to write detections from, we can also look at creating a PoC for penetration testing and vulnerability assessment purposes! A double win! This really goes to show how valuable honeypots can be from a broad TI perspective as well as supporting defence and offence!

A double edged sword (or pot?), like so many things in life!

Suggested Actions to take

  • Check if you or your hosting providers run CPANEL
  • Check for compromise (or request intel from a partner)
  • If no compromise detected patch the server
    • if you can’t patch consider using an IP allow list/VPN or other method to shield access from anywhere on the internet (you might want to do this even if you have patched)
  • If compromised follow your incident repsonse process

Each scenario is different so I’ll not try and tell everyone exactly what they should do here, the key point of this blog is to highlight the vulnerability, the threat/risk so people can take the appropriate steps.

Also, you probably want to check out the honeypots at Defused! They are awesome!

[update] just found this in the packets: H2ckt3ch@g0dl1k3 (cm9vdDpIMmNrdDNjaEBnMGRsMWsz is the BASE64). I won’t publish all the packets right now (because that probably won’t help this early on) but this string was interesting…

AI

one step closer to Skynet?

Yesterday I ran a pentest against an RDP server, the process was ok but not amazing, I had to provide more help than I would have liked, resource consumption and the idea it should keep going…. wasn’t great. The process and output wasn’t terrible at all but it didn’t blow me away.

So today I wanted to see if Claude could take on as simple active directory lab! Now let’s be clear, there were I think one or two updates to the Claude client in that time! The Claude UI even changed look and feel! So I span up an AD lab I had made a while ago and got to work!

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Threat Intel

SMSBlasters Historic Incidents

Whilst some people go on about DNSSEC, PUBLIC WIFI and JUICE JACKING they seem to be missing out on a threat that is real, active and has seen increased adoption by threat actors. SMS BLASTING!

Sounds cool, but basically it’s an ISMSI Catcher/Fake CELL network that is broadcasted between 500m and 2Km that lets an attacker send SPOOFED SMS messages to any cell that connects. This can be used for scams, phishing etc.

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Leadership

The danger of internet exposed RDP

There’s lots of things in cyber security to consider when looking at how to defend a network, and whilst the world goes mad about public wifi and juice jacking, the real threats are often far simpler. Imagine having say an Active Directory domain member, or even controller exposed to the internet with Remote Desktop Protocol? Might sound insane but this is a common route for entry for ransomware actors.

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