- It requires being thorough.
- It required documenting things.
- It requires conducting training and drills.
- It adds what can be viewed as additional effort/cost to the primary goals (sell widgets/services/time)
- It involves weird and wonderful ways of abusing functionality that is not always apparent or expected, thus to the typical consumers/user of a service, the idea that it might be abused actually seems very unlikely (to a criminal or security pro, the idea it will be abused seems far more likely based on threat intelligence etc.)
Ok this is going to be really short post, but expect more later! Did you ever want to run CME but you were stuck on a Windows machine? Well don’t worry you can! How do we do this?
First we download CME
Extract the zip file
Make sure you have python3 installed!Read more “CrackMapExec (CME) on Windows”
You never know what you will find when you go hunting! So here’s a quick tale of an explore I did using Advanced Hunting!
I went hunting here in Advanced Hunting:Read more “Threat hunting with some funny results!”
Did you want to check out some of your detections? This isn’t everything of course but it’s a simple batch file to simulate a range of enumeration techniques used by actors like CONTI or LOCKBIT affiliates/operators:Read more “Simulating Human Operated Discovery”
A common way to deploy an encryption routine used in Ransomware scenarios is to create a scheduled task to launch a cyptor exe. This is commonly deployed via a Group Policy Object (GPO).
So I wanted to look at how with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) we could detect this both on domain controllers but also on CLIENT devices (MEMBER SERVERS/PCs)Read more “Hunting for New Group Policies Where Scheduled Tasks are used”
If you work in marketing you are probably walking around telling everyone that we all live in a ZERO trust era, that PASSWORDS are DEAD! Ransomware is DEAD and AI is the FUTURE and we should be doing that NOW!
Meanwhile back on CYBER PLANET EARTH, most organisation do NOT have or need AI, they use passwords and well they passwords they use are shockingly bad! Howe do I know this? I do password audits and security testing, but I also look at breach data! (and we have other people publish password audit reports etc.)Read more “It’s 2023 and people’s passwords are still really really bad!”
When forming a strategy you must realise for starts that people view the word strategy differently. However, the general view is STRATEGY AS A PLAN. Without a PLAN a strategy is a DREAM.
The plan must be supported by a rang of factors, it must also be managed. It should be something which helps you go from where you are (CURRENT STATE) to where you want to be (FUTURE STATE) and should have a roadmap (TRANSITION PLAN/ROADMP) of how you will get there.
When we talk about can I see your strategy, you will need to have it documented, a strategy without a document isn’t a strategy that can be shared and communicated. As to what “THE STRATEGY” document must be… well there is no such thing as a MUST, but there’s some component that are largely and widely recognised to be useful.Read more “Strategy”
Clearly this is for penetration testing, not for evil! So if you have to pentest Office 365 you might want to be attacking the authentication services. This will be aligned to the tenant you are testing, as always make sure you have authorisation.
Deploy to your favourite LINUX instance or WSL etc.Read more “Password Spraying Office 365”
Whilst conducting security testing and assurance activities, I went looking to show logon events in Office 365. My first query was on IdentityEvents, this led to a view of a multi month attack by a threat actor/s against a tenent, followed by exploring the rabbit hole of logs and computer systems. This blog summarises some of the methods and findings when considering threat hunting and authentication defences for Office 365. (bear with me I am tired so this might need a bit of a tune up later!)Read more “Defending Against Direct Authentication Attacks in Microsoft Office 365”